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Call for Papers

Launch Conference
Regulating Moral Hazard

Inaugural Conference of the Journal of Financial Regulation
Paris, France | July 11-12, 2014

Click here to view the conference programme


The threat of moral hazard has played an influential role in shaping post-crisis policy debates about the optimal role and limits of financial regulation as a means of constraining socially excessive risk-taking. Simultaneously, however, our understanding of moral hazard – its potential sources, its impact on financial markets and institutions, and the most appropriate regulatory responses – is far from complete. Where does moral hazard reside within the financial system? How does it influence the decisions of market participants, financial regulators, and elected policymakers? How can we identify and measure its impact? What role does financial regulation play in generating it? And, most importantly, what role can regulation play in preventing – or at the very least minimizing – its pernicious effects?

Regulating Moral Hazard, the inaugural conference of the Journal of Financial Regulation published by Oxford University Press, sought to enhance our understanding of these and other important questions.

  • The sources of moral hazard within the financial system. The ‘sources’ of moral hazard in this context can be understood as referring to both the location of socially excessive risk-taking (e.g. systemically important financial institutions, the shadow banking system, etc.) as well as its underlying causes (e.g. implicit and explicit state guarantees, the provision of liquidity by central banks, the interdependent relationship between sovereigns and domestic financial services sectors, etc.);
  • The relationship between the increasingly integrated structure of the global financial system, the largely fragmented regulatory system which governs it, and the ability of both public and private sector actors to externalize their socially excessive risk-taking;
  • Regulatory responses on a global or regional level to constrain the moral hazard of sovereigns – including, for example, the evolving role of the European Central Bank and new Single Supervisory Mechanism/Resolution Mechanisms and their impact on moral hazard in the Eurozone;
  • The emerging role of the U.S. Federal Reserve as de facto global lender of last resort and its impact on moral hazard at the global level;
  • The role and limits of both conventional regulatory tools (e.g. risk-based supervision and capital requirements) and recent regulatory reforms (e.g. liquidity requirements, bail-in and structural regulation) in constraining moral hazard within financial institutions; and
  • The role of constitutional and administrative law, as well as other forms of public sector governance, in generating or constraining moral hazard.

Submission Process


About the Journal of Financial Regulation

The Journal of Financial Regulation is a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to examining theoretical, policy and practice-related issues in the area of financial regulation. The journal seeks to publish world class scholarship which examines these issues from an interdisciplinary, international, and comparative perspective. The journal is published by Oxford University Press. Further information about the journal – including its aims and objectives, submission process, and subscription details – is available on the journal’s website:

The Journal of Financial Regulation is edited by:

Dan Awrey, University of Oxford
Thierry Bonneau, University Paris II Panthéon-Assas
Chris Brummer, Georgetown University Law Center
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Copenhagen Business School and University of Oxford
Marco Ventoruzzo, Bocconi University and Pennsylvania State School of Law
Geneviève Helleringer, Essec Business School Paris-Singapore and University of Oxford


Dan Awrey
Thierry Bonneau
Chris Brummer
Geneviève Helleringer
Wolf-Georg Ringe
Marco Ventoruzzo

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